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THE INDIVIDUAL AS BENEFICIARY OF
STATE IMMUNITY:
PROBLEMS OF THE ATTRIBUTION OF ULTRA VIRES
CONDUCT
MIZUSHIMA TOMONORI"
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a truism among international lawyers that the state immunity
principle might bar a domestic legal action brought against a foreign
state. There has been much discussion about the extent to which a
foreign state is immune from domestic jurisdiction. No matter what
answer is given to this still controversial issue, the fact remains that a
state can act only through natural persons, who do not ordinarily enjoy
immunity from suit. Partly for this reason, several actions have been
brought against individuals who acted on behalf of a foreign state Can
they, and to what extent, invoke and enjoy state immunity?
We can hardly say that this question has received an answer based
on a comparative law analysis. The scope of past observations on
beneficiaries of state immunity other than a foreign state itself was
mainly limited to non-natural persons such as state-owned corporations
or political subdivisions of the state. Thus, even were they to enjoy
state immunity, we could pose the same question as above with regard
to individuals who acted for these entities. The purpose of this article is
to clarify case law concerning individuals' entitlement to state
immunity from the standpoint of the attribution of an act to a state.'
Particular emphasis is placed on problems of ultra vires conduct of state
officials.
Some preliminary remarks are useful. This article focuses upon
state immunity from foreign civil proceedings. Certainly, a number of
* Doctoral Candidate, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University; LL.M., London, 1999;
LL.M., Kyoto, 1995; LL.B., Tokyo, 1993. The writer wishes to thank those who
commented on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy for their painstaking editorial work. Needless to
say, it is only to the writer that any remaining errors are attributed.
1. In this article, except in the asterisked footnote, "to 'attribute' an act to someone"
means, "to regard, for the purposes of law, an act of a natural person as an act of a legal
subject." Other possible terms, such as "impute" or "ascribe," are used only in the case of
direct citations.
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(quasi-) criminal cases exist in which immunity was granted to a
foreign state or its agency.2 However, most domestic criminal rules are
intended to apply only to natural persons. In such cases, it is neither
necessary nor possible to prove the immunity of foreign states, and the
position of individuals who acted on behalf of a foreign state is at best
unclear.!
Let us take the four criminal cases that Bothe cited in 1971 in
support of his argument that state officials are, in certain
circumstances, immune from foreign criminal proceedings.4 In regard
to the McLeod case,5 it should not be ignored that, contrary to the
diplomatic correspondence between the two countries concerned, which
was in favor of McLeod,' the court, in fact, denied immunity.7 Horn v.
Mitchell" is also a case in which immunity was denied. The court found,
"no ground for extending to him any of the privileges or exemptions
which might result from a finding that his act was a national act."9
The two other cases, in which immunity was granted, concern
members of foreign armed forces and do not imply the extension of
immunity to non-members. In In re Gilbert', Judge de Azevedo stated
that, "if the crime were devoid of any military aspect, the case would
undoubtedly fall under the local jurisdiction."" In the Scordalos case,12
the defendant was a Greek marine. Although this Egyptian case was
decided without an applicable treaty between Egypt and Greece, it has
been pointed out that the Egyptian courts of those days were influenced
by the Anglo-Egyptian convention, which provided for the immunity of
members of the British Forces. 3 It is also to be noted that, in a similar
2. E.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production,
Transportation, Refining & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952);
Australia v. Midford (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., 86 I.L.R. 640 (Malay. Sup. Ct. 1990).
3. See, e.g., Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, [2000] 1 App. Cas. 61, 110 (Eng. 1998)
[hereinafter Pinochet (No. 1)] (Lord Nicholls); Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, (No. 3)
[2000] 1 App. Cas. 147, 283 (Eng. 1999) [hereinafterPinochet (No. 3)] (Lord Phillips).
4. See Michael Bothe, Die strafrechtliche Immunitat fremder Staatsorgane, 31
ZEITsCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 246 (1971).
5. 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
6. Correspondence between Great Britain and The United States, respecting the
Arrest and Imprisonment of Mr. McLeod, for the Destruction of the Steamboat Caroline,
29 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1126 (1840-1841).
7. People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). For a comment to this
effect, see also PASQUALE DE SENA, DIRITO INTERNAZIONALE E IMMUNITA FUNZIONALE
DEGLI ORGANI STATALI 45 (1996).
8. 232 Fed. 819 (1st Cir. 1916), affg 223 Fed. 549 (D. Mass. 1915).
9. Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
10. 13 Ann. Dig. 86 (Braz. Sup. Fed. Ct. 1944).
11. Id. at 90.
12. Cass., Feb. 7, 1944, JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX MIxTES, No. 3308, May 19/20, 1944,
at 2 (Egypt).
13. E.g., Alexandre Pathy, Bulletin de la jurisprudence6gyptienne, 67-72 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 390, 391 (1940-1945); See G.P. Barton, Foreign Armed Forces:
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agreement with the United States, Egypt reserved the right to
prosecute civilian employees. 4
Recent practice points to, if anything, non-immunity from criminal
proceedings" and provides no authority in favor of immunity.' In order
to avoid unnecessary confusion, it would be advisable to exclude
criminal cases unless light can be shed, in one way or another, upon
this study.
Further, given the subject matter of this article, i.e. the
relationship between individuals who do not ordinarily enjoy immunity
from suit and state immunity, some other cases fall outside its scope.
One of them concerns some specific categories of individuals, e.g.
diplomats or heads of state, who ordinarily enjoy immunity irrespective
of whether their acts are attributed to the state." Cases in which these
individuals are involved will be dealt with only where attribution might
matter. Another is a case that took place before the state immunity
principle was undoubtedly established."
The final preliminary remark concerns the so-called act of state
doctrine. Chief Justice Fuller provided the classic definition of this
doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez,9 when he said, "[Tihe courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
Qualified Jurisdictional Immunity, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 341, 351 (1954). The
Convention concerning the Immunities and Privileges to be enjoyed by the British Forces
in Egypt, Aug. 26, 1936, provides, '4. No member of the British Forces shall be subject to
the criminal jurisdiction of the Courts of Egypt, nor to the civil jurisdiction of those Courts
in any matter arising out of his official duties." 173 L.N.T.S. 433.
14. Agreement concerning Immunity from Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters of
Members of the United States Forces in Egypt, Mar. 2, 1943, 204 L.N.T.S. 425. Moreover,
the immunity regime under this agreement was intended to cease at the end of the war.
15. E.g., R. v. Mafart and Prieur, 74 I.L.R. 241 (N.Z. High Ct. Auckland Registry
1985).
16. In Pinochet (No. 3), Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, "As to the charges of murder
and conspiracy to murder, no one has advanced any reason why the ordinary rules of
immunity [ratione materiae] should not apply and Senator Pinochet is entitled to such
immunity." [2000] 1 App. Cas. at 205. As will be seen, however, this reasoning is open to
objection.
17. E.g., Luigi Condorelli, L'imputation ez l'ttat d'un fait internationalement illicite:
solutions classiques et nouvelles tendances, 189 RECUEIL DES COUiLs 9, 76 (1984).
18. In Waters v. Collot, the governor and commander in chief of a French island was
sued before a U.S. court. Win. Bradford, U.S. Att'y Gen., stated, "With respect to his
suability, he is on a footing with any other foreigner (not a public minister) who comes
within the jurisdiction of our courts. If the circumstances stated form... a sufficient
ground of defence, they must, nevertheless, be regularly pleaded;...." 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
45, 46 (1794). After the court held Collot to bail, this action was discontinued. 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 247 (1796). The opinion of Lee, U.S. Att'y Gen., concerning the Henry Sinclair
cases, apparently of a civil nature, is couched in slightly different terms, "[A] person
acting under a commission from the sovereign of a foreign nation is not amenable for
what he does in pursuance of his commission, to any judiciary tribunal in the United
States." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1797).
19. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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another done within its own territory." 20 Needless to say, "[this]
doctrine is peculiar to Anglo-American law,"2' and distinct from the
state immunity principle.
While state immunity is a matter of
procedural law, the act of state doctrine is arguably one of substantive
law.' Hence, "the act of state doctrine exempts no one from the process
of the court."'
However, it is not always easy to recognize which
principle was applied.
For instance, in regard to Underhill v.
Hernandez,' the U.S. Supreme Court itself later comments that,
"sovereign immunity provided an independent ground".'
Thus,
mention of cases in which the act of state doctrine was at issue is not
necessarily excluded.
II. THE

INDIVIDUAL AS BENEFICIARY OF STATE IMMUNITY

As already mentioned, the question whether, and under what
circumstances, individuals can invoke state immunity has attracted no
particular attention. As a result, the provisions of national legislation
give little guidance in this respect.2
Section 14 of the U.K. State
Immunity Act 1978, for instance, provides, "(1)... [R]eferences to a
State include references to-(a) the sovereign or other head of that
State in his public capacity; (b) the government of that State; and (c)
any department of that government".2 The other possible beneficiaries
of state immunity specified in that section are any entity (a "separate
entity") which is distinct from the executive organs of the government of
the state and capable of suing or being sued, and the constituent
territories of a federal state. In the recent Argentine legislation, no
definition or explanation is given to the term "foreign State" (Estado
extranjero).28 The Australian Foreign State Immunities Act of 1985, in
accordance with which "a natural person" who fulfills certain conditions
20. Id. at 252.
21. F.A. MANN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ENGLISH COURTS 164 (1986).
22. In Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., the English courts have dealt with
these two principles at separate stages. Compare the judgment of the House of Lords
[1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 317 with that of the Court of Appeals [20011 1 Lloyd's Rep. 161
(2000). See also SIR ROBERT JENNINGS, THE PLACE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW 12 (1988).

23. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba et al., 425 U.S. 682, 726 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. 168 U.S. 250 (1897)
25. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).
26. For principal pieces of national legislation, see Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property,UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20, at 1-70 (1982).
27. U.K. State Immunity Act, §14 reprintedin 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
28. Law 24.488, Inmunidad de jurisdicci6n de los Estados extranjeros ante los
tribunales argentinos [1995-B] Legislaci6n Argentina 1500. The Argentine Supreme
Court, in eventually denying immunity, applied this statute to a foreign state agency.
Saravia v. Agencia de Cooperaci6n Internacional del Jap6n, Corte Sup. [1999-Il J.A. 509
(1998).
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is to enjoy immunity as a "separate entity" of a foreign state, can be
regarded as an exception.2
Most instruments of an international character are equally not free
from such ambiguity. It does not seem that the work of the
International Law Commission (ILC) has clarified this point. A number
of writers 30 have suggested a broad interpretation of "representatives of
the State acting in that capacity" as one of the beneficiaries of state
immunity under the ILC Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of
It is questionable, however, whether all
States and Their Property.
the individuals who act on behalf of a foreign state can be considered
"representatives of the State."32
On the other hand, the International Law Association Draft
Convention on State Immunity makes its position quite clear. Georg
Ress, in his final report to the Association, stated:
[The term "foreign State" in this Draft Convention] is not intended to
cover individuals, because the reasons underlying the concept of state
immunity do not apply. Court action against an individual (who would
then be liable with his personal estate only) does not implicate
of state immunity
sovereignty or sovereign equality.... [Tihe problem
33
arises only if a state is named as party tO a suit.

29. Australian Foreign States Immunities Act §§ 3(1), 22, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715
(1986).
30. Christian Tomuschat, JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property:
The Draft Convention of the InternationalLaw Commission, in VOLKERRECHT, RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN, WELTWIRTSCHAFTSRECHT: FESTSCHRIFr FOR IGNAZ
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN 603, 621 (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel et al. eds., 1988); Burkhard HeB,
The InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Convention on the JurisdictionalImmunities
of States and Their Property, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 269, 279 (1993).
31. Art. 2(1)(b)(v), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1565 (1991). The other beneficiaries in the
ILC Draft Articles are, "(i) the State and its various organs of government; (ii) constituent
units of a federal State; (iii) political subdivisions of the State...; (iv) agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and other entities". Id. at art. 2(1)(b).
32. In the commentary, the ILC states, "[This] category of beneficiaries of State
immunity encompasses all the natural persons who are authorized to represent the State
in all its manifestations ..... Thus, sovereigns and heads of State in their public capacity
would be included under this category .... Other representatives include heads of
Government, heads of ministerial departments, ambassadors, heads of mission,
diplomatic agents and consular officers, in their representative capacity." Report of the
Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Forty-third Session [1991] 11-2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2).
33. Georg Ress, Final Report on Developments in the Field of State Immunity and
Proposal for a Revised Draft Convention on State Immunity, International Law
Association, Report of the 66th Conference 452, 466 (1994). See also Jurgen Brohmer,
STATE IMMUNITY AND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 50, 55 (1997); Karl Doehring and

Georg Ress, Diplomatische Immunitat und Drittstaaten: Uberlegungen zur erga omnesWirkung der diplomatischen Immunitat und deren Beachtung im Falle der
Staatensukzession, 37 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 68, 97 (1999).
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The first question is whether such a denial of individuals'
entitlement to state immunity is in accordance with case law. Initially,
a number of cases are examined which have been, or might be, taken to
constitute authorities in favor of the absence of immunity. This is
followed by an examination of those in which immunity was granted.
Setting this aside momentarily, we ought to bear in mind that the
denial of jurisdictional immunity does not necessarily amount to the
existence of responsibility as a matter of substantive law. Indeed, it has
been argued that, whether or not individuals are immune from suit,
they are not held responsible vis-A-vis the plaintiff for their acts on
behalf of a foreign state." Therefore, it must be noted that Ress'
statement contains two distinct propositions.
A.

Denial of State Immunity to the Individual?

(1) Belgium: Mesdag v. Heyermans, decided in the nineteenth
century, deserves to be mentioned." Heyermans's painting, displayed
at an exhibition in Brussels, was withdrawn without her consent at the
request of Mesdag, a Dutch official. The Court of Appeal of Brussels
denied its competence for two reasons.3 First, the Court states that
Mesdag enjoys immunity, at least for acts done in his official capacity,
because he is an "envoy of foreign governments" within the meaning of
the Belgian decree at issue. Second, the Court found that the acts in
question did not fall within the judicial power of the government since
they were purely administrative acts. In both respects, the Court of
Cassation annulled this judgment.37 It seems that the denial of the
second point by the Court of Cassation suggests the absence of the
immunity of the state itself under the circumstances of this case.
(2) Danzig: In the Polish Officials in Danzig case,3 the defendant
was sued for damages allegedly arising out of his activity as a Polish
customs officer. The High Court rendered a judgment to the effect that,
"[tihere was no reason whatsoever to assume that a foreign official on
duty in Danzig who did not come within [the domestic law provisions at
issue concerning persons invested with diplomatic character] should be
able to claim immunity from any action arising in connection with his

34. E.g., Soc. Vivai industriali Roma v. Legazione dell'Arabia Saudita, Trib. Roma,
Nov. 20, 1953, 38 RWiSTA DI DIRITTo INTERNAZIONALE 79 (Italy); GAETANO MORELLI,
DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE 201-02 (2d ed. 1954).
35. See also Dreyfus fr~res et Cie v. Godderis fr~res, CA Bruxelles, Aug. 4, 1877,
Pasicrisie belge 1877, II, 307. This Dreyfus case is virtually identical, in its facts and its
holding, with a French case, Isidore Dreyfus v. Dreyfus fr~res. See infra text accompanying
notes 40-42.
36. CA Bruxelles, June 25, 1897, PANDECTES PERIODIQUES 1897, 615.
37. Cass. 2e ch., May 23, 1898, 26 J. DU DROIT INTL PRIVE 618.
38. 6 Ann. Dig. 130 (High Ct. 1932).
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(3) France: In Isidore Dreyfus v. Dreyfus frres,0 subscribers sued
French bankers who dealt with loans on behalf of the Peruvian
government. According to the Court of Appeal of Paris, "the Peruvian
government not being a party [of the appellants' personal undertaking
in question], the appellants cannot invoke... the principle of the law of
nations (viz. state immunity]".41 On the other hand, the Court states,
"[In the issue and the service of the loans [the appellants] acted only as
mandataries and financial agents of the government of Peru;... [Iun
this capacity, they are not personally obliged towards the third
subscribers,.....
The court, while denying the application of state
immunity, did not hold the defendants personally responsible for their
acts as agents of the Peruvian government. The Court of Cassation
rejected the appeal. As seen below, other French cases have not denied
state immunity to individuals or private companies.
(4) Ireland (Eire): In the de las Morenas case,43 the head of a
commission appointed by the Spanish government to purchase horses
for its army was sued for breach of contract. Justice O'Byrne, for the
Supreme Court, said:
He is sued in his personal capacity and the judgment... will bind
merely the appellant personally,.... I am not aware of any rule of
international law under which mere agents of a foreign State can claim
immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in which they
are carrying out their duties .... Where the Sovereign is not named as
a party and where there is no claim against him for damages or
otherwise, and where no relief is sought against his person or his
property, I fail to see how he can be said to be impleaded either directly
or indirectly."
Unusual circumstances in this case, however, are not to be ignored.
Due to the war situation, the defendant could not procure information
directly from the Spanish government. Had such information been
available, the result might have been different. 5 Furthermore, as will
be seen, the above approach has not been adopted in recent Irish cases.
(5) Netherlands: In Church of Scientology v. Herold,4 Herold, the
39. Id. at 131.
40. Cass. ch. civ., Aug. 14, 1878, Dalloz, RECUEIL PERIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE [D.P.]
1879, I, 57.
41. Id. at 57 (the writer's translation).
42. Id. at 59 (the writer's translation).
43. [1945] I.R. 291 (H. Ct. and S.C. 1944).
44. Id. at 300-03.
45. Indeed, the High Court adjourned the proceedings due to lack of this information.
Id. at 293-94.
46. 65 I.L.R. 380 (Dist. Ct. Amsterdam 1980). See also Edwards v. Bureau
Wijsmuller, 94 I.L.R. 361 (C.A. Amsterdam 1987).
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Chief of the German Federal Police, was sued in a defamation case
because the article in question allegedly was based on a police report.
For certain procedural reasons, the court regarded Herold as a litigant
only in his private capacity, and said, "Thus, exceptions under
international law limiting the Dutch Court's jurisdiction over sovereign
states... do not apply to him."47 This judgment a contrario suggests
that the problem of immunity would arise if he appeared in his official
capacity. Indeed, the court noted that Herold, "correctly stated that, in
his official capacity, he should in law be identified with the German
Federal Republic."
Moreover, the court eventually found this claim
inadmissibile and did not deal with the merits of the case. For while
Herold appeared before the court only as a private person, the act in
question was carried out in his official capacity.
(6) U.S.: In Arcaya v. Pdez,49 an action for libel against the Consul
General of Venezuela, immunity was not granted despite the
Venezuelan Ambassador's note to the effect that Pdez wrote the letter
at issue in pursuance of his duties. The court states, "[A] consul's
duties are commercial but.., they may be enlarged by special
authority. To be effective such an enlargement must, however, 'be
recognized by the government within whose dominions he assumes to
exercise it'."0 If this is the case for a consul, far less likely is the
immunity of other individuals in these circumstances.
It is
questionable, however, whether "it" in the court's citation could be so
extended as to apply in this case since originally "it" referred to,
"authority to represent [a sovereign] in his negotiations with foreign
states, or to vindicate his prerogatives.""l Be that as it may, as seen
below, this case does not represent consistent U.S. case law prior to the
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 (FSIA).
Republic of Philippinesv. Marcos, 2 a case under the FSIA, concerns
the motion to quash a subpoena served on Ordonez, the Philippine
Solicitor General. Judge Orrick states:
[TIhe sovereign immunity doctrine may not serve as a basis for
Ordonez' immunity... because it is not applicable to individual
government officials.. .. The terminology of [§ 1603(a) of the FSIA]"agency," "instrumentality," "entity," "organ"-makes it clear that the
statute is not intended to apply to natural persons, except perhaps to
the extent that they may personify a sovereign.'

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Herold at 381.
Id.
145 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affdper curiam, 244 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1957).
Id. at 470.
The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 435, 446 (1818).
665 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Id. at 797.

2001

INDIVIDUAL AS BENEFICIARY OF STATE IMMUNITY

269

Since the motion was eventually granted on the grounds of
Ordonez's diplomatic status, the above remark is dictum. Furthermore,
as will be seen, other U.S. courts have not followed this reasoning.
B.

Grant of State Immunity to the Individual

(1) Australia: The question, as already mentioned, has been settled
by legislation. It is worth remembering, however, that the court in
Grunfeld v. United States of America,' where the termination of a
contract was at issue, already had granted immunity to an officer
commanding a certain U.S. office. The court stated that, "[iut is well
to sovereign immunity is not limited to the
settled that an entitlement
55
foreign sovereign himself."
(2) Canada: Walker v. Bank of New York, 6 which followed a number
of precedents,57 is of particular importance. The Ontario Court of
Appeal granted immunity not only to U.S. government employees,
whose immunity was not disputed, but also to bank employees, because,
"[tihey acted at the request of U.S. government law enforcement officers
for the purpose of assisting them in their investigation of possible
criminal activities."" According to the court, "the use of the broad word
'organ' in the [Canadian State Immunity] Act ... indicates the intention
of parliament to protect individuals ... who act at the request of a
foreign state in situations where that state would enjoy sovereign

immunity."5 9

(3) France: A number of cases, while decided in earlier periods,
have not lost their significance.' The most illustrative among them is
54. [19681 3 N.S.W.R 36.
55. Id. at 37.
56. 16 O.R.3d 504 (1994).
57. E.g., Tritt v. U.S., 68 O.R.2d 284 (High Ct. 1989); Jaffe v. Miller, 13 O.R.3d 745
(C.A. 1993). In Jaffe u. Miller, the court found no difference, with regard to individuals'
entitlement to state immunity, between the Canadian State Immunity Act 1982 and the
common law principle. See Jaffe, 13 O.R.3d 745 (C.A. 1993).
58. Walker at 508. The court thus reversed the decision of Day, J., who had stated,
"In no decided cases which were argued, has ad hoc assistance to a foreign government
served to transform an individual or private corporation into a governmental agency for
the purposes of state immunity." 15 O.R.3d 596, 601 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. 1993).
59. Id. at 508. The Ontario Court of Appeal recently confirmed, while reserving its
decision about, "whether the immunity enjoyed by functionaries of the sovereign is
independent of or derives from that enjoyed by the sovereign itself", that, "[elven if the
immunity enjoyed by the individual defendants is merely derivative, they are protected
from the claims.., by virtue of the immunity enjoyed by the USA." U.S. v. Friedland, 46
O.R.3d 321, 329 (1999).
60. E.g., Luchmann v. Heymann, CA Nancy, Aug. 31, 1871, D.P. 1871, II, 207;
Saabrok v. Soci6t6 maritime auxiliaire de transports, CA Rennes, le ch., Mar. 19, 1919,
18 REVuE DE DROIT INT'L PRIVt 743; Lakhowsy v. Gouvernement f~dral suisse, CA
Paris, le ch., Mar. 16, 1921, 48 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL. 179. Esnault-Pelterie
v. The A. V. Roe Cy Ltd. is also instructive, though the defendant is a private company
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Bernet v. Herran, where the members of a commission appointed to
supervise a Honduran loan were sued for negligence and fraudulent
manipulations. The Court of Appeal of Paris said:
Considering that.., the members of the commission received their
appointment only from the government of Honduras, and that they
worked only by its will, by virtue of its delegation, and by subjecting
their acts to its ratification, it results from the principle of the
reciprocal independence of States that, as for the said acts
accomplished in the exercise of these functions, they cannot, any more
than the government... be subjected to the jurisdiction of the French
tribunals, and that any action brought against them in this regard
must be declared not admissible;.. 62
The Court of Cassation found the appeal inadmissible.
(4) Germany: In the Church of Scientology case,0 the plaintiff
sought an injunction to restrain the defendant, a senior officer of the
London Metropolitan Police, from making allegedly false accusations.
Accepting the submission for the defendant, the court announced:
The acts of such agents [as the defendant] constitute direct State
conduct and cannot be -attributed as private activities to the person
authorized to perform them in a given case. Any attempt to subject
State conduct to German jurisdiction by targeting the foreign agent
performing the act would undermine the absolute immunity of
sovereign States in respect of sovereign activity."
(5) Ireland: In McElhinney v. Williams,' the question apparently
remained unanswered whether Williams, a corporal in the British
Army, can invoke state immunity. Herron v. Ireland' provided a clear
answer. Two British officers were included among the defendants, as
this action concerned an English court's refusal to order the return of
the plaintiffs child who was wrongfully abducted by the father.67 In
regard to the Attorney General for England and Wales, the Irish
Supreme Court definitively stated, "[T]here is no doubt that he is
entitled to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity."'
The court

rather than an individual. Trib. civ. Seine, 3e ch., Apr. 1, 1925, 52 JOURNAL DU DROrr
INTERNATIONAL 702.

61. Cass.ch.civ., Apr. 21, 1886, D.P. 1886, I, 393.
62. Id. at 394 (the writer's translation).
63. 65 I.L.R. 193 (Fed. Sup. Ct. 1978).
64. Id. at 198 (citation omitted).
65. [19951 3 I.L.R.M. 276 (S.C.).
66. 242/1997 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997) (LEXIS, IRELND Library, CASES File). See also
Schmidt v. Home Sec., 103 I.L.R. 322 (High Ct. 1994).
67. In re M. (A Minor) (Abduction) [19941 2 Family Law Reports [F.L.R.] 126 (C.A.
1993).

68. Herron v. Ireland, supra note 66.
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reached the same conclusion for the British Official Solicitor in saying:
[H]e was acting as an officer of the British Courts at the request of the
English Courts to furnish them with his view as an amicus curie
[sic] ... He was also acting as head of the child's abduction unit and
again it appears to be beyond doubt that he acted throughout in his
official capacity and he performed a function which was entrusted to
him by the Court.'
(6) Philippines: The case law of this country is firmly established. 0
The position, which has invariably been taken, is summed up by the
following view of the Supreme Court in United States of America v.
Guinto":
While the doctrine [of state immunity] appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same... the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 2
(7) U.K.: Propend Finance Pty. Lid. v. Sing 3 confirmed that the
U.K. State Immunity Act of 1978 did not affect a number of
precedents." Documents relating to alleged tax evasion by Propend
were seized through mutual judicial assistance at the request of
Australia. Contrary to Sing's undertaking to the court, extracts from
the documents were sent to Australia. Proceedings for contempt of
court were brought against Sing and the Commissioner of the
Australian Federal Police Force. As Sing was granted diplomatic
immunity, what interests us is the immunity granted to the
Commissioner. Finding that the police function is essentially a part of
governmental activity, the Court of Appeal held:

69. Id.
70. E.g., Syquia v. Lpez, 18 I.L.R. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Johnson v. Turner, 21 I.L.R.
103 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Baer v. Tizon, 57 Supreme Court Reports Annotated [S.C.R.A.] 1
(1974); Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 S.C.R.A. 88 (1988). See generally Florentino P.
Feliciano, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity from Suit in a Developing and Liberalizing
Economy: Philippine Experience and Case-law, in JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 173, 178-79 (Nisuke Ando ed., 1999).
71. 182 S.C.R.A. 644 (1990).
72. 182 S.C.R.A. 644, at 653-54 (1990).
73. 111 I.L.R. 611 (Q.B. 1996 and C.A_ 1997).
74. E.g., Twycross v. Dreyfus, 5 Ch. D. 605 (C.A. 1877); Rahimtoola v. Nizam of
Hyderabad, 1958 App. Cas. 379 (1957). For a succinct account of these cases, see C.A.
Whomersley, Some Reflections on the Immunity of Individualsfor Official Acts, 41 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 848, 849-50 (1992). See also Godman v. Winterton, 11 Ann. Dig. 205 (C.A.
1940).
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The protection afforded by the Act of 1978 to States would be
undermined if employees, officers... could be sued as individuals for
matters of State conduct in respect of which the State... had
immunity. Section 14(1) [of the Act] must be read as affording to
individual employees or officers of a foreign State protection under the
same cloak as protects the State itself.75

It went on to say, "Where [a 'separate entity' (section 14)] exists
and is entitled to immunity, then its servants or officers would of course
benefit by immunity ....
Further, an individual might possess status
as a corporation sole or similar status which could constitute him in
that capacity a 'separate entity' ... 7
This position has been
maintained in subsequent cases. 7
8
(8) U.S.: In Heaney v. Government of Spain,"
the court, making
reference to a provision of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law, granted state immunity to Gomero without taking
account of his consular status. 7' Then, and only then, the court
considered, "perhaps unnecessarily, whether Gomero's actions could be
considered as exceeding his consular functions" 80 and confirmed
consular immunity as well.

The FSIA has brought about little change in this respect. Republic
of Philippinesv. Marcos, cited above, is rather isolated, and a number of
district courts, both before and after this case, admitted the
applicability of the FSIA to individuals." In Chuidian v. Philippine

75. 111 I.L.R. at 669.

76. Id. at 670.
77. In In re P. (DiplomaticImmunity: Jurisdiction),the defendant was able to enjoy
state immunity notwithstanding the denial of diplomatic immunity, [1998] 1 F.L.R. 1026
(Fain. and C.A.). See id. the decision of President Sir Stephen Brown. The Court of
Appeal did not address the issue of immunity. In Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, it was
confirmed that, whether the applicable law was the State Immunity Act or the common
law, "[wihere [state] immunity applies, it covers an official of the state in respect of acts
performed by him in an official capacity." [20001 1 W.L.R. 1573, 1583 (H.L.) (Lord Millett).
For an analysis of the latter case, see Mizushima Tomonori, One Immunity Has Gone...
Another...: Holland v Lampen-Wolfe, 64 MOD. L. REV. 472 (2001).
78. 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Underhill v. Hernandez, supra note 19;
Bradford v. Director General of Railroads, 278 S.W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Oliner v.
Can. Pac. Railway Co., 311 N.Y.S.2d 429 (App. Div. 1970).
79. Hearney at 505.
80. Id.
81. E.g., Mueller v. Diggelman, No. 82 Civ. 5513 (CBM), 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16970
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983); Am. Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr.,
653 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Herbage v. Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1990), affd without opinion, 946 F.2d 1564
(D.C. Cir. 1991). Rios v. Marshall ought to be cited with a brief comment. The court held
that, "insofar as Edwards is sued in his official capacity as agent of the instrumentality,
he is equally protected by principles of foreign sovereign immunity." Rios v. Marshall, 530
F. Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). It is not clear whether his immunity is based upon the
FSIA or other grounds.
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National Bank,82 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed
these decisions. The Bank was sued for its refusal to make payment
under a letter of credit. Daza, an official of the Philippine government,
was later added as a defendant. Observing that, "[ilt is generally
recognized that a suit against an individual acting in his official
capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against the sovereign
directly," the court concluded that, "section 1603(b) [which defines an
'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'] can fairly be read to
include individuals sued in their official capacity."3
Also to be noted in this case is the United States government's
"Statement." The United States argues, "Daza is not covered by the
[FSIA] because he is an individual rather than a corporation or an
association, but he is nevertheless entitled to immunity under the
general principles of sovereign immunity expressed in the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 66(b)."" Although the court did not
take this approach, the difference between this "Statement" and the
court's finding is immaterial for the purpose of this study.
Despite some negative views on this judgment,5 courts in other
circuits also have found the FSIA applicable to individuals in
subsequent cases," so that, as was recently stated, "maintenance of a
coherent practice regarding foreign sovereign immunity weighs heavily
in favor of applying the FSIA to individuals."87

82. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
83. Chuidian, 912 F.2d. at 1101 and 1103 respectively.
84. Id. at 1099. It seems that § 66(b) was wrongly quoted and § 66(f) should replace it.
The relevant part of § 66 reads, "The immunity of a foreign state.. . extends to ... (b) its
head of state and any person designated by him as a member of his official party;... (f)
any other public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in
his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law
against the state; .... "

85. E.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, The Claim to Foreign Sovereign Immunity by Individuals
Sued for International Human Rights Violation, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 465, 469 (1994);
Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INr'L L. 403, 405 (1995). Ress'
statement is in part a reaction to this case. See Ress, supra note 33, at 465-66.
86. E.g., Granville Gold Trust v. Commissione del Fullimento, 924 F. Supp. 397 and
928 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd without published opinion, 111 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
1997); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ortega Trujillo v.
Banco Central del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (S.D. Fl. 1998). A mention of some other
cases might be appropriate. For example, Xuncax v. Gramajo reached its conclusion,
"[wlithout deciding whether the scope of FSIA immunity should be thus extended".
Xuncax v. Granmajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175 (D. Mass. 1995). Dewhurst v. Telenor Invest

AS denied the application of the FSIA to the individual defendants, but this was simply
because the corporations which employed them were not considered to be "agencies or
instrumentalities" of a foreign state and consequently the individual defendants never
acted on behalf of the foreign state. Dewhurst v. Telenor Invest AS, 83 F. Supp. 2d 577 (D.
Md. 2000).
87. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 11 n.3 (D.D.C. 1998). See also
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C. Some Observations
In the past, a number of cases existed that suggested a negative
answer to the question of individuals' entitlement to state immunity.
Yet, it is evident that they did not correctly reflect case law as it stands
today.
The vast majority of cases in various jurisdictions have
recognized the individual as a beneficiary of state immunity. It is thus
submitted that Ress' view mentioned earlier is clearly against the
weight of authority.
The question might be posed whether such a practice is compatible
with the argument that, for instance in the U.K., "[t]he immunity of the
Crown was only tolerable because it did not extend to ministers and
Crown officers, who were liable personally in law for anything unlawful
that they did; and it made no difference that they were acting in an
official capacity."88 An affirmative answer is suggested. State immunity
under international law is no more than immunity from legal
proceedings before foreign domestic courts, and it does not make states
immune either from their own legal proceedings89 or from any sort of
responsibility. 90 In other words, to grant state immunity prescribed by
international law does not mean the end of the rule of law.
We ought not to lose sight of the problem of the extent to which
such alternative measures are practical. This, however, falls well
outside the scope of this article. If this study can shed any light, it is
upon the question of whether the withholding of state immunity from
individuals would result, in return for making state immunity
"illusory,"9' in more satisfactory protection of the plaintiffs claim. An
affirmative answer does not automatically follow. Several authorities,
which are necessarily rare due to the very practice of according state
immunity to individuals, suggest that, as a matter of substantive law,
individuals are not held personally responsible vis-A-vis the plaintiff for
their acts on behalf of a foreign state. If this argument is correct, the
plaintiffs claim fails even if state immunity is not granted and the

Bolkiah v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 547 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1999).
88. Sir William Wade, The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and
Liability, in THE NATURE OF THE CROWN: A LEGAL AND POLITIcAL ANALYSIS 23, 25-26
(Maurice Sunkin & Sebastian Payne eds., 1999).
89. See, e.g., G.G. Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts,
14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101, 122 (1993); Nacci v. Bari Institute, 114 I.L.R. 539, 554 (Italy
Ct. Cassation Plenary Session 1994).
90. See, e.g., Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States before National
Authorities, 149 RECUEIL DES CouRs 87, 96 (1976); Peter D. Trooboff, Foreign State
Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles, 200 RECUEIL DES CouRs 235, 268 (1986).
91. Diplock, L.J., says, "[Tihe immunity to which [a foreign sovereign government] is
entitled in respect of its acts would be illusory unless it extended also to its agents in
respect of acts done by them on its behalf." Zoernsch v. Waldock [1964] 1 W.L.R. 675, 692
(Eng. C.A-).
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court has jurisdiction. While jurisdictional immunity for those who are
legally responsible might be open to criticism, the same cannot be said
for those who are not.
Individuals' entitlement to state immunity would be all the more
permissible in cases where they are sued not for their own acts, but on
the grounds of vicarious liability. For vicarious liability to arise, it is
required that a person stands in a particular relationship to the actor
and that the act is referable in a certain manner to that relationship.'
In cases of our concern, it is a state institution that makes such a
relationship conceivable. It would then be far from persuasive that a
plaintiff, bringing a legal action on this basis, attempts to deny the
immunity which the state, if sued, could enjoy.
III. ATTRIBUTION TO THE STATE OF ULTRA VIRES CONDUCT OF ITS
OFFICIALS

If individuals having no immunity ratione personae could enjoy
state immunity, it would be safe to seek the grounds of the immunity by
attributing their conduct to a foreign state. As state immunity is
arguably a rule of international law, this is attribution under
international law.
Certain acts might not provide the basis of
immunity for an individual even if they are attributed to the state: e.g.
commercial activities. 9 Even then, the analysis of attribution still has
more than academic interest, for the burden of proof could be shifted.
It would be apposite to compare suits against a foreign state with
those against an individual. In the former, insofar as a presumption of
immunity exists for foreign states, neither party needs to prove
attribution. Consequently, state immunity usually is granted or denied
without touching upon the problem of attribution. Only in unusual
cases could it matter. For instance, a court might find an otherwise
applicable exception to state immunity inapplicable due to nonattribution, according immunity as a result." The paucity of such cases,
however, makes further analysis premature. On the other hand, in the
latter, the attribution of conduct to a foreign state plays a critical role
as a precondition for the operation of the state immunity principle, for
individuals would otherwise enjoy no immunity. From these cases,
therefore, we could obtain some meaningful observation on problems of

92. E.g., WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 693 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 15th ed. 1998).
93. See, e.g., the Philippine Supreme Court's view with regard to the individual
defendants in G.R. No. 76607, Guinto at 662.
94. E.g., Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983);
First Fidelity Bank v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989);
Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1994); Storr v. National Defence
Security Council of the Republic of Indonesia-Jakarta, 95 Civ. 9663 (AGS), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15890 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1997).
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attribution.
Herein lies another question to be asked, "Where are the outer
limits of attribution?"
More specifically, "Does an individual's
entitlement to state immunity extend to his ultra vires conduct?"
What makes this apparently straightforward question debatable is
in part the argument in the field of state responsibility under
international law that ultra vires conduct of state officials is, at least to
some extent, attributable to the state. A number of writers, in their
analyses of the immunity granted to some specific types of individuals,
refer to a provision concerning the attribution of ultra vires conduct in
the ILC's work on state responsibility. 95 Thus, although we could
simply argue that no analogy is permissible because attribution for the
purposes of state responsibility is not intended to serve other
purposes,9 it would not entirely be meaningless to see some problems of
the attribution of ultra vires conduct in state responsibility. Partly for
the same reason, the analysis in the following section is mainly confined
to the work of the ILC, though, needless to say, its work is not all that
counts for the arguments of state responsibility.
A.

Attribution of.Ultra Vires Conduct in State Responsibility

It has incontestably been stated that, "[ilt is the national legal
order, the law of the state, which determines under what conditions an
individual acts as an organ of the state."97 That is why this question is
qualified as "apparently straightforward" in the preceding paragraph.
It is to be conceded that, since we are discussing responsibility under
international law, the ILC is undeniably correct in saying, "[Tihe
attribution of conduct to a State for the purpose of establishing the
possible existence of an internationally wrongful act by that State can
take place only in accordance with international law."9 Yet, it is
completely conceivable that international law delegates to domestic law
the decision of what is to be regarded as an act of the state.9 From this
standpoint, one can naturally ask why ultra vires conduct can
nevertheless be attributed to the state, if not for every purpose of
international law.

95. Jean Salmon, Immunitos et actes de la fonction, 38 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 314, 348 (1992); Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International

Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and ForeignMinisters, 247 RECUEIL DES
COURS 9, 56 n.90 (1994).
See also MONIKA LOKE, DIE IMMUNITAT STAATLICHER
FUNKTIONSTRAGER 184-85 (2000).
96. See [1973] II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 189.
97. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 117 (1952).

98. [19731 II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 181.
99. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 97, at 117; 1 DIONISIO ANZILOTTI, CORSO DI DIRrIrrO
INTERNAZIONALE (4th ed.) in 1 OPERE DI DIONISIO ANZILoTrI 1, 224, 387 (1955).
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Traditional arguments on state responsibility were centered on the
treatment of aliens. In line with such a tradition, Garcia Amador, the
ILC's first Special Rapporteur on this topic, limited the scope of his
work to, "international responsibility of the State for injuries caused in
its territory to the person or property of aliens". State responsibility for
injuries caused by ultra vires conduct has long been a controversial
issue. In this respect, the revised draft prepared by Garcia Amador
provided that ultra vires conduct was attributed to the state if the
officials, "purported to be acting in their official capacity" and if the
conduct was not "totally" or "manifestly" outside the scope of their
competence."l As is well known, this draft did not come to fruition.
The ILC afterwards decided to deal with, "the rules which govern
all the new legal relationships which may follow from an
internationally wrongful act of a State, regardless of the particular
sector to which the rule violated by the act may belong." 10 ' This change
in approach carries two implications. First, the ILC did away with the
traditional limitation to the treatment of aliens. Second, and no less
significantly, the ILC limited its work to "state responsibility for its
wrongful act," excluding "state responsibility without its wrongful 1act"
objects. 0°
such as responsibility for damage caused by the fall of space
Insofar as this approach is maintained, it is not objectionable that
the ILO has addressed problems of attribution in the work on state
responsibility for its wrongful act, i.e. the ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility.ln For, as a matter of elementary logic, if a state is held
responsible for an internationally wrongful act of the state, there exists
"an act of the state" which is to be qualified as "internationally
wrongful,""°4 and it is necessary to know what constitutes such an act.
What is and what is not attributable to the state under international
law is provided for in a fairly detailed manner in Articles 5 to 15. For
instance, the conduct of a state organ having that status under
domestic law is, irrespective of the position of the organ in the state's
organization, attributed to the state (Articles 5 and 6), and the conduct
of persons not acting on behalf of a state is not attributed to the state
(Article 11).
Article 10, which addresses ultra vires conduct, provides, "The

100. Art. 12(2)-(4). See [1961] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 47-48.
101. [1973] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 170.
102. The ILC subsequently began its work on, "international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law."
103. As the second reading of these Articles has not been completed at the time of
writing, use is made of those adopted in 1996. For the text, see 37 I.L.M. 440 (1998).
104. Art. 3 of the ILC Draft Articles provides, "There is an internationally wrongful act
of a State when: (a) conduct... is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State." For the
text, see 37 I.L.M. 440 (1998).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYV

VOL. 29:4

conduct of an organ of a State,... such organ having acted in that
capacity, shall be considered as an act of the State under international
law even if, in the particular case, the organ exceeded its competence
according to internal law or contravened instructions concerning its
activity." This provision attributes broad, if not unlimited, scope of ultra
vires conduct to the state. The broader scope than that in Garcia
Amador's draft can be confirmed by the ILC's comment that, "[tihe
limitation to exclude from qualification as acts of the State the actions
of organs in situations of 'manifest' lack of competence has no place in
the rule defined in [Article 10]."'
As in the case of the other Articles, the ILC referred to numerous
relevant precedents in accordance with its "preference for an essentially
inductive method, rather than for deduction from theoretical
premises."'6 The writer entirely agrees with the result of the ILC's
induction from these precedents that a state is held responsible for
ultra vires conduct of its officials. Yet, the correctness of its inductive
argument ends there. If the conclusion of the attribution of ultra vires
conduct is to be reached, it has to be confirmed that state responsibility
arising from such conduct is state responsibility for its wrongful act,
rather than state responsibility without its wrongful act. Needless to
say, it is only the former that necessarily presupposes the existence of
an act of the state.
In order to a posteriori confirm this, it is essential to ascertain, in
advance, features which are peculiar to state responsibility for its
wrongful act, and which state responsibility without its wrongful act
does not possess, and then to examine whether the responsibility at
issue conforms to them. It is not feasible, however, to ascertain the
features of state responsibility for its wrongful act without identifying
acts of the state. In other words, for this a posteriori method the
purpose of which is to prove the attribution of acts, we need to identify
acts attributable to a state.
This would mean that, if we are to decide acts of a state for the
purposes of state responsibility, we must resort to an a priori method at
some stage. One possible way would have been to a priori consider that
specific acts, e.g. acts of the state in accordance with domestic law, are
acts of the state under international law. Instead, the ILC a priori
considered that state responsibility for certain conduct, e.g. ultra vires
conduct, is state responsibility for its wrongful act, and deduced the
attribution of the conduct from this premise. Whether such a method
brings about appropriate results is another matter.
No matter how the conclusion is drawn, one wonders whether any
useful purpose is served by qualifying intra vires acts and ultra vires
105. [1975] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 69.
106. [1973] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172.

2001

INDIVIDUAL AS BENEFICIARY OF STATE IMMUNITY

279

acts equally as acts of the state, if, all other conditions being equal,
different legal consequences ensue in terms of state responsibility.
Viewed from such a standpoint, the opinion of the European
Commission of Human Rights in Ireland v. United Kingdom17 requires
reconsideration. This opinion is cited in support of the argument that
Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles conforms to practice under the
European Convention on Human Rights." This argument is based upon
the Commission's observation that, "[a state's] existing obligations can
be violated also by a person exercising an official function vested in him
at any, even the lowest level, without express authorisation and even
outside or against instructions."1' 9
The Commission shows, however, neither a theoretical basis nor
any authority for considering that a person acting ultra vires can violate
an obligation that the state owes. Be that as it may, later in this
opinion, the Commission states, "[Tihe elements constituting a practice
[in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention] are repetition of
acts and official tolerance . ... ""
It also says, "The question
remains, ... whether or not [the acts] were officially tolerated with the
consequence that... the violations established are to be regarded more
serious.""' These passages plainly indicate that state responsibility
arising from ultra vires acts, in the absence of official tolerance, is
different from state responsibility arising from intra vires acts, which
are necessarily accompanied by official tolerance.
Another example is "assurances and guarantees of non-repetition"
of the wrongful act provided for in Article 46 of the ILC Draft Articles
as a form of, "rights of the injured State and obligations of the State
which has committed an internationally wrongful act.""2 Undoubtedly,
with regard to intra vires conduct, a state could give assurances or
guarantees of non-repetition by promising to no longer authorize the
conduct at issue.
However, from the nature of things, without
excessively extending the meaning of the terms, a state could not give
"assurances" or "guarantees" of non-repetition of the same sort of ultra
vires conduct any more than it could do as regards non-repetition of the
fall to Earth of one of its space objects. This ,in addition, illustrates a
similarity between state responsibility for ultra vires conduct and state
responsibility without its wrongful act.
The considerations outlined above lead us to doubt whether the
attribution of ultra vires conduct can satisfactorily explain state
107. 23-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 8 (1976).
108. HARITINI DIPLA, LA RESPONSABILITE DE L'ETAT POUR VIOLATION DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME: PROBLEMES D'IMPUTATION 36-39 (1994).

109.
110.
111.
112.

Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 393-94.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 478.
37 I.L.M. 440, supra note 103, at art. 46.
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responsibility for such conduct. Rather, the theory of risk,"3 based upon
the risk that a person entrusted with a certain state activity, which is
as such lawful, causes injuries by acting ultra vires, is less artificial and
more cogent. It is less artificial in that this theory does not regard ultra
vires acts as acts of the state, and more cogent in that it can explain
differences between ultra vires acts and intra vires acts as well as
similarities between state responsibility for ultra vires conduct and
state responsibility without its wrongful act.
As regards state
responsibility for ultra vires conduct, Anzilotti refers to the, "necessity
for each State to give others a guarantee against the danger that its
internal organization, with regard to which it enjoys the broadest
freedom, could represent to them.""4 From today's standpoint, this is
nothing but a justification for state responsibility without its wrongful
act," though, for Anzilotti, this was a reason for the attribution of ultra
vires conduct to the state.
B.

FunctionalImmunity and Ultra Vires Conduct

The above analysis on state responsibility does not obviate the need
to examine whether state immunity is granted to individuals for ultra
vires conduct. As seen below, a view exists which affirmatively answers
this question without touching upon the argument of state
responsibility. Before addressing this issue, however, the problem of
ultra vires conduct is examined in the context of functional immunity,
i.e. jurisdictional immunity under international law to be granted in
respect of a specific function of states (or international organizations)." 6
Jean Salmon's suggestion that case law has retained functional
immunity even for ultra vires conduct 7 might have a bearing upon
individuals' entitlement to state immunity for conduct of a similar sort.
Strictly speaking, each functional immunity provision should be
interpreted and applied in accordance with its own object and purpose,
and no generalization ought to be lightly assumed. It is submitted with
respect that some of the Law Lords in Pinochet (No. 3) made a
misconceived interpretation. As is widely known, whether Pinochet

113. E.g., Charles de Visscher, La responsabilitd des Etats, 2 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA
89, 91-92 (1924); Maurice Bourquin, Rgles gdndrales du droit de la paix, 35 RECUEIL DES
Cous 1, 215-16 (1931).
114. ANZILOrI, supra note 99, at 388 (the writer's translation).
115. See, e.g., Art. 1 of the current ILC Draft Articles on International Liability, which
provides, "The present articles apply to activities not prohibited by international law and
carried out in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of a State which
involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical
consequences." For the text, see, for example, (1995] HI-2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 89.
116. For instance, Art. 43(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides
for consular immunity, "in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions."
117. Salmon, supra note 95, at 348.
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was to enjoy immunity or not depended upon, subject to, "any necessary
modifications, " " Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, which provides for subsisting immunity for diplomats after
leaving post "with respect to acts performed ... in the exercise of his
functions as a member of the mission." 9 The qualification of this
immunity as immunity ratione materiae is correct in that this immunity
is accorded for the reason of subject matter. Indeed, it is suggested that
Article 39(2), "applies only to acts performed on behalf of or imputable
to the sending State."'20 However, nowhere is it provided that immunity
ratione materiae of this sort, "applies not only to ex-heads of state and
ex-ambassadors but to all state officials who have been involved in
carrying out the functions of the state."'
By way of illustration, while Article 39(2) does not exclude the
possibility of immunity from criminal jurisdiction, 22 it is highly
doubtful, as pointed out at the outset, whether such immunity exists for
those to whom this provision does not apply.'2 We should rather
consider that such a rule as laid down in Article 39(2), "constitutes a
combination of immunity ratione personae and ratione materiae."24 As
Yoram Dinstein appropriately qualifies, Article 39(2) immunity is
m
"diplomatic"
(ori ty"head
it is applicable to heads of state as
well
mun
r tio of
e state" •if 126
well)' immunity ratione materiae. Insofar as an element of immunity
ratione personae is involved, we cannot necessarily infer the immunity

of other persons.
Consequently, even if the observation that functional immunity has
been granted for ultra vires conduct should be correct, it does not

automatically follow that state immunity is granted to state officials
118. U.K. State Immunity Act, § 20(1), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
119. EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION

ON DIPLoMATIc RELATIONS 357-63 (2d ed. 1998).
120. Id. at 363
121. Pinochet (No. 3), [2000] 1 App. Cas. at 205 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
122. See, e.g., the Tabatabai case. In this criminal case, the court denied Art. 39(2)
immunity due to its finding that "the importation of narcotic substances... is not to be
classified as one of the official functions of a special envoy." Tabatabai, 80 I.L.R. 388, 424
(F.R.G. Superior Provincial Ct. 1986). If Art. 39(2) were inapplicable to criminal cases, the
classification would have been unnecessary.
123. Therefore, Lord Millett's observation in Pinochet (No. 3) that "any narrow
statutory immunity is subsumed in the wider immunity in respect of other official or
governmental acts under customary international law" is also open to objection. [2000] 1
App. Cas. at 270.
124. F.A. Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q. REV. 42 and 155,
49 (1943).
125. The Swiss Federal Tribunal says, "Articles 32 and 39 of the Vienna Convention
must.., apply by analogy to Heads of State." Marcos and Marcos v. Fed. Dep't of Police,
102 I.L.R 198, 203 (1989). But see Hazel Fox, The Pinochet Case No.3, 48 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 687, 693-94 (1999).
126. Yoram Dinstein, Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae, 15
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 76 (1966).
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acting ultra vires. We must ascertain what is the basis of functional
immunity for ultra vires conduct and whether it could also be the basis
of state immunity to individuals for such conduct. For example, if, as is
pointed to by Salmon, 11 7 Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility is the reason for according functional immunity for ultra
vires conduct, the basis of immunity for state officials in general is
provided. For this provision applies irrespective of the function at
issue.
It is questionable, however, whether Salmon's observation is
supported by the cases cited by him and can serve as a starting point
for discussion. For instance, otherwise applicable consular immunity
was withheld from the following persons: a person who was entrusted
by a vice-consul to set in order the documents of a deceased marquis,
but who, availing himself of this occasion, entered the apartment and
burnt the will of the marquis; a consul general who converted and
appropriated the funds which his government sent to him in trust for
the plaintiff;'2 and a vice-consul who was prosecuted on account of a
sexual assault during the ordinary hours of business against a woman
who came to renew her passport.1u
As pointed out, the scope of Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles is
broad. The cases that the ILC had in mind include the Youmans case,"'
in which Mexico was held internationally responsible for the acts of its
soldiers who, contrary to the order to protect the U.S. nationals
threatened by a mob, shot and killed one of them. 32 Thus, Article 10
would cover the cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph, if it is
appropriate at all. Nevertheless, immunity has been denied in those
circumstances.
Insofar as the writer is aware of, the only case, among those cited
by Salmon, which might support his argument is Boyer v. Aldr&te.'3 In
this defamation case against the consul general of Panama, the Civil
Tribunal of Marseille stated:
[Tihis absolute incompetence [of the French courts with regard to
foreign consuls' function] would subsist even in the hypothesis in which
the acts of a foreign consul were tainted by the excess of authority or
the diversion of authority, only the Tribunals of the State which he
127. Salmon, supra note 95, at 348.
128. J.-B. Fassio et J~r~me Fassio v. Bocconi, Trib. civ. Nice, Jan. 21, 1896, 24 J.

DU

DROIT INTL PRIVE 131 (Fr.).

129. Carl Byoir & Assoc. v. Tsune-Chi Yu, 112 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1940).
130. L. v. The Crown, 68 I.L.R. 175 (N.Z. Sup. Ct. Auckland 1977).
131. Youmans (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A_ 110 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Claims
Comm'n 1926).
132. Id.
133. Trib. civ. Marseille, 9e ch., Oct. 18, 1956, Gazette du Palais 1956, 2,
jurisprudence, 319 (Fr.).
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represents being qualified to judge such an abuse." 4
This argument bases immunity for ultra vires conduct not on the
attribution of, or state responsibility for, such conduct but on the
allegedly exclusive competence of the courts of the foreign state
concerned. Taken to extremes, this would mean that immunity is
granted for virtually all acts of a foreign consul. The result that follows
comes much closer to purely "personal" immunity, rather than
"functional" immunity. To infer from this isolated and somewhat
unpersuasive instance that, as a matter of principle, functional
immunity is granted even for ultra vires conduct would go too far. It
seems that the basis of the contrary proposition that, in principle,
functional immunity has been withheld in ultra vires cases is the
stronger.
C.

State Immunity Granted to the Individual for Ultra Vires Conduct?

Since functional immunity as defined earlier and state immunity,
even where the latter's beneficiary is an individual, are not coextensive, the former might be available when the latter is not, and vice
versa. Accordingly, the observation in the preceding paragraph does not
a priori mean the denial of state immunity to individuals in ultra vires
cases, and separate analysis is called for.
It would not be out of place to begin this section with Pinochet (No.
3). As stated, a number of the Law Lords addressed the immunity issue,
rightly or wrongly, as a matter of state immunity ratione materiae
rather than as one of former head of state immunity. Moreover, despite
the criminal character of this case, some of the Law Lords suggested
Pinochet's immunity from civil proceedings." If Chilean law prohibits
torture, does it follow that immunity would have been granted to the
individual in civil proceedings for ultra vires acts?"
A negative answer must be given. Even if, in written law taken at
face value, torture is prohibited and therefore at first sight ultra vires
conduct, another fact should not be overlooked. In this case, it was
submitted for the government of Chile, intervening, that, "[it] deplores
the fact that the government at the time violated human rights".' 7 In
short, at least ex post facto, the Chilean government conceded the
attribution of Pinochet's conduct, rendering it difficult to see an ultra

134. Id. at 320 (the writer's translation).
135. (2000] 1 App. Cas. at 264 (Lord Hutton); 278 (Lord Millett); 281 (Lord Phillips).
136. On the other hand, Pinochet (No. 1), in which all the Law Lords dealt with the

issue as a matter of former head of state immunity, is of little assistance for the analysis
of individuals' entitlement to state immunity from civil jurisdiction for their ultra uires
conduct. [2000] 1 App. Cas. 61.
137. [20001 1 App. Cas. at 172.
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vires character in the conduct. 3 '
However, in obiter saying that, "Senator Pinochet could... claim
immunity if sued in civil proceedings for damages," 3 9 Lord Hutton had
state responsibility for ultra vires conduct in mind. 0 As noted, the
argument based upon state responsibility leads to the proposition that
immunity would be granted to individuals irrespective of whether he is
a former head of state or not.
Equally, the dictum of Lord Millett should not be ignored. He
stated:
[Immunity ratione materiae] is available whether the acts in question
are illegal or unconstitutional or otherwise unauthorised under the
internal law of the state, since the whole purpose of state immunity is
to prevent the legality of such acts [i.e. official and governmental or
sovereign acts] from being adjudicated upon in the municipal courts of
a foreign state. A sovereign state has the exclusive right to determine
what is and is not illegal or unconstitutional under its own domestic
law. 141
This argument coincides, in its essence, with the reasoning of Boyer
v. Aldr~te, i.e. the exclusive right of the foreign state concerned.'4
This study indicates that state immunity has not been granted to
individuals for ultra vires conduct on the above, or any other, grounds.
In according state immunity to individuals, some of the courts already
mentioned have stressed that the conduct at issue was carried out intra
vires. Furthermore, in a number of jurisdictions, state immunity has
been denied to individuals because of the ultra vires nature of their
conduct.
In Wright v. Cantrell"3 , a defamation action before an Australian
court, immunity was not granted because, according to Chief Justice
Jordan, "[tihe defendant is not alleged to have defamed another
member of the forces in the course of making a report about him which
it was his duty to make, but to have defamed a civilian whilst doing
something in the course of his duties."'" Although Chief Justice Jordan
assumed that the defendant was a member of the visiting forces, Justice
Roper rather considered the defendant as a civilian employee of the
U.S. and said, "If this view.., is correct the reasoning of [Jordan,
138. For a comment to this effect in the context of state responsibility, see [19751 II
Y.B. INVL L. COMM'N 61-62.
139. Pinochet (No.3), [2000] 1 App. Cas. at 264.
140. Id. at 252, 264.
141. Id. at 270.
142. Boyer, Trib. civ. Marseille, 9e ch., Oct. 18, 1956, Gazette du Palais 1956, 2,
jurisprudence, 319 (Fr.).
143. 44 N.S.W. St. R. 45 (1943).
144. Id. at 53.
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Philippine case law leaves no ambiguity. In Sanders v. Veridiano
the Supreme Court said, "[Tihe mere invocation of official
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for
an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess
of his authority." 14 Applying this criterion, the Supreme Court has
denied immunity in a number of cases. 148 Of particular importance
among them is United States of America v. Reyes 49 , in that the court did
not accept the following submission: "[Elven if [the individual
defendant's] act were ultra vires, she would still be immune from suit
for the rule that public officers or employees may be sued in their
personal capacity for ultra vires and tortious acts is 'domestic law' and
not applicable in International Law.""'
11,46

U.S. case law is no less unambiguous in refusing state immunity to
those who acted ultra vires. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, in
Pilger v. United States Steel Corp., ' the Public Trustee, a corporation
sole of the U.K., was sued for the seizure and retention of the stock
purchased by Pilger. Affirming that the Public Trustee is a British
governmental agency and that he acted ultra vires, the court stated:
An instrumentality of government, whether corporate or not,.., does
not cease to be personally answerable for acts done under color of the
authority conferred upon it, but, in fact, in excess of that authority and
without legal justification. The immunity of a sovereign against suits
arising out of the unlawful acts of its representatives does not extend
to those who acted in its name, and cannot be set up by them as a bar
to suits brought against them for the doing of such unlawful acts. 152
Likewise, after the enactment of the FSIA, the U.S. courts
indicated their intention to deny, or did deny, immunity on the grounds
of ultra vires conduct in various cases, whether brought under the Alien
Tort Claims Actin or not." Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesial" would
145. Id. at 54.
146. 162 S.C.R.A. 88 (1988).
147. Sanders, 162 S.C.R.A. at 94.
148. E.g., Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 S.C.R.A. 713 (1990); Wylie v. Rarang, 209
S.C.R.A. 357 (1992).
149. 219 S.C.R.A. 192 (1993).
150. Id. at 204.
151. 130 Atl. 523 (N.J. 1925).
152. Id. at 524. See also Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308 (N.D. Cal. 1929).
153. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995);
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp.
1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
154. E.g., Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, supra note 82; Alicog v. Kingdom of
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serve as an example. This case relates to promissory notes allegedly
issued by the National Defense Security Council of Indonesia. In
respect of the individual defendant, the Court of Appeals, remanding
the case, said, "If the district court finds that Mawardi's actions were
within the scope of his authority, then Mawardi is entitled to a
presumption of immunity under the FSIA; if Mawardi acted without
authority, the FSIA cannot shield him from suit in his individual
capacity." It went on to say, "If the foreign state has not empowered
its agent to act, the agent's unauthorized act cannot be attributed to the
foreign state; .... "151
It does not seem that any objection can be raised to these cases.
The citation of authority would no longer be required to point to
possible bases of state immunity, such as the principles of sovereignty,
independence, equality and dignity of states. Whether or not any of
them can really provide a satisfactory basis, given that ultra vires
conduct is, by definition, what the state does not authorize or even
prohibits, the denial of state immunity to individuals acting ultra vires
would be contrary to none of them.
It is true that a state might be held legally responsible even for
ultra vires conduct. Yet, this,. standing alone, does not provide any
theoretical or practical reason for making such individual actors
immune from jurisdiction or responsibility. With regard to Lord
Millett's remark,"" it remains unclear why a foreign court cannot
determine whether an act was carried out intra vires or ultra vires,
whereas it can determine, as he presupposes, whether an act was
official or not. It is submitted that the view that state immunity is
granted to individuals even where they acted ultra vires is supported
neither by principle nor by authority.
IV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has demonstrated that the individual is recognized as a
beneficiary of state immunity. The basis for this was sought in the
attribution of the conduct to a foreign state. Problems of ultra vires
conduct were then examined from the standpoint of attribution in state
responsibility and that of functional immunity. Some views that have
been put forward in these areas, if correct, might lend support to state
immunity to individuals even for their ultra vires conduct. However,

Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Doe v. Bolkiah, 74 F. Supp. 2d 969 (D.
Haw. 1998); Shalaby v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, 97 Civ. 9393 (DC), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17571 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1998).
155. 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 307.
157. Id. at 308.
158. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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closely analyzed, the bases of these views are rather weak. More
importantly, state immunity has simply been denied to individuals
whose ultra vires acts were at issue, and no reason can be found for
according state immunity to such individuals. We can conclude that
there is no ground, either in theory or in practice, to consider that ultra
vires conduct is attributed to the state.
As we have seen, at present, there usually exists a presumption of
immunity for foreign states, whereas no such presumption exists for
individuals. That being the case, different results in terms of immunity
could ensue in civil proceedings concerning ultra vires conduct. If
proceedings are brought against individuals who acted ultra vires, no
room is left for state immunity to be granted. On the other hand, a
foreign state, if named as a defendant, might enjoy immunity from such
proceedings. If this does occur,"9 the immunity accorded to the state
can be explained only as a sort of immunity ratione personae,
illustrating, "the accepted position that state immunity is a personal
plea exempting a state from the jurisdiction otherwise properly
exercisable by reason of its personal status as an independent and
equal state." 16

159. E.g., Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Management Co. v. Jamsostek, 97 Civ. 5116
(HB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8181 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1998) and 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1563 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1999). In this case, immunity was denied to the individual
defendant, an employee of an enterprise owned by the Indonesian government, who
engaged in reinsurance activities without authority, whereas immunity was granted to
Indonesia and the enterprise. Id. This is not to say that immunity has been granted to a
foreign state in every ultra vires case. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419
(9th Cir. 1989).
160. Hazel Fox, Access to Justice and State Immunity, 117 L.Q. REV. 10, 13 (2001).

